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I.
A.

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF APPEAL

Roberta Shore Has Failed To Mitigate Her Damages.
In his opening brief, Nicholas Bokides ("Bokides"), the third party

defendant/appellant, pointed out the trial judge's error in finding that Roberta Shore ("Roberta"),
the third party plaintiffi'respondent, had no duty to mitigate damages. In response, Roberta Shore
repeatedly asserts that the district court's decision was based upon substantial evidence.
However, Bo kid es asks the Court to focus on four critical facts that he believes require a finding
that Roberta failed to reasonably pursue mitigation of her damages. First, although she argues to
the contrary, the decree of divorce required Bill Shore ("Bill") to defend and hold Roberta
harmless from any indebtedness "related to the closely held corporation Bear River Farm
Equipment, Inc., including but not limited, to any claims or litigation against the parties arising
out of the business operated by Bear River Farm Equipment, Inc. including attorney fees and
costs." R. at 604, Findings of Fact~- 16. The claims by McCormick clearly fall within this
provision. Bill even admitted in his discovery responses that he had agreed to "indemnify
Roberta Shore from the claims" alleged by McCormick against Roberta and himself R. at 98101, William Shore's Responses to Third Party Defendant's First Combined Discovery Requests
at 9-10. And, the trial judge acknowledged Bill's duty to defend and indemnify Roberta. R. at
608-209. Second, Roberta failed to even respond to McCormick's motion for summary
judgment or file a third-party complaint against Bill. She did absolutely nothing to defend
herself against McCormick. In fact, she made a decision not to pursue any claim against Bill
notwithstanding the provision in the divorce decree before discovering Bokides' negligence.
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Again, the trial judge acknowledged this fact as well. Id. at 15. Third, in February of 2010, Bill
prepared a financial statement in response to discovery requests propounded by Bokides. Tr.,
p. 107, L. 23, p. 108, L. 8, Exhibit 113. As of February 2010, Bill estimated that his net worth,
after subtracting all current liabilities from his total assets, was $230,920. Exhibit 113. Bill's net
worth in February 2010 would have been sufficient to pay McCormick's $200,000 settlement
offer. There is absolutely no evidence that Roberta ever investigated or considered the financial
statement and/or pursuing a claim against Bill. This is patently unreasonable because Bill had
already admitted he owed a duty to indemnify her. Unlike the above two facts, the trial court did
not address Bill's asserted net worth (which may have been substantially higher than $230,000).
Instead, the judge assumed that Bill was 'judgment proof." Memorandum Decision at 16. This
assumption was not supported by substantial evidence; indeed, the evidence was to the contrary.
Fourth, by the time Bill submitted his financial statement that showed funds available, Roberta
was not in a position to pursue a claim against Bill because she and Bill had the same attorney.
She could not even ask her attorney to look into a potential claim against Bill because of the
relationship. She failed to hire her own counsel or do anything to pursue the claim. The facts
demonstrate that Roberta did not pursue or investigate a potential claim based upon Bill's
February 2010 financial statement.
"It is well established that the party entitled to the benefit of a contract has a duty

to use 'reasonable exertion' to mitigate his damages." 0 'Neil v. Vasseur, 118 Idaho 257,262,
796 P.2d 134, 139 (Ct. App. 1990). '"The doctrine [of avoidable consequences] requires
reasonable effort to mitigate damages. Thus, ifreasonable, the efforts need not be successful."'
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Davisv. FirstlnterstateBankofldaho, NA, 115 Idaho 169,171,765 P.2d 680,682 (1988). In
January of 2010, Bill admitted that he had a duty to indemnify Roberta. In February of 2010,
Bill submitted a financial statement demonstrating that he had assets to cover all or part of
McCormick's claims. Roberta unreasonably ignored these two facts. The Court should reverse
the district court's ruling and find that Roberta failed to mitigate her damages.
B.

The Court Should Overturn the Judgment Against Bokides To Prevent An
Unfair \Vindfall in Roberta's Favor.
As previously argued in his opening brief, Bokides submits that the Court should

overturn the entry of judgment in this situation to prevent an unjust windfall in Roberta's favor.
In opposition, Roberta argues that this issue was not argued below and that the Court should not
consider the argument because there is no dispute that "McCormick has a judgment against
Roberta Shore as a direct and proximate result of the negligence/malpractice of Bokides."

Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief at 15. The Court should not consider these arguments.
First, Bokides did submit this argument below. On pages 13 and 14 of his trial
brief, Bokides reiterates the arguments contained in his motion for summary judgment, and states
that:
McCormick has the option of pursuing its judgment against either
William Shore, Roberta Shore, or both, to the extent one or the
other has insufficient funds to satisfy the entire judgment. If
McCormick elects to proceed against William Shore, and records
its judgment against the property owned by William Shore, which
it may, it would to able [sic] foreclose on its claims and sell the
property, and receive full reimbursement for its judgment. If
McCormick pursues this option, Roberta Shore will suffer no
damages.

Trial Brief 14, R. at 500. Bokides has preserved this argument for appeal.
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Second, Bokides urges the Court to consider the possibility that Roberta could
very well be the beneficiary of a windfall if the Court affirms the judgment entered by Judge
Brown. What would prevent McCormick from first attempting to recover from Bill and then
going after Roberta for any amount left? In this scenario, McCormick may only seek to collect a
portion of the total amount owed if it recovers some amounts from Bill. In addition, what would
prevent Roberta from paying off the McCormick judgment from the Bokides judgment and then
going after Bill for indemnity under the separation agreement? Under either of these scenarios,
Roberta would end up with money in her pocket, making a profit off of this lawsuit. It would
give Roberta "a windfall opportunity to fare better as a result of [Bokides '] negligence than [she]
would have fared if [Bokides] had exercised reasonable care." Paterek v. Petersen, 118 Ohio St.
3d 503, 508 (Ohio 2008). The Court should not allow this to occur.
II.
A.

REBUTTAL TO CROSS APPEAL

The District Court Properly Excluded the Tractor Financed Prior to the
Entry of the Divorce Decree from the Judgment.

The district court properly excluded the tractor financed prior to the entry of the
divorce decree from the judgment. The McCormick judgment includes eight (8) tractors/farm
implements floored or financed by Bear River though Agricredit. One of the tractors was floored
prior to the conclusion of the divorce. Therefore, the district court, after applying the legal
standard set forth in Sohn v. Foley, 125 Idaho 168, 868 P.2d 496 (1994), concluded that Roberta
would have been liable pursuant to the guaranties for said tractor and that portion of the
McCormick judgment was not proximately caused by Bokides' negligence. R. at 608.

4
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As part of the divorce proceedings, Bokides agreed to notify Agricredit and
McCormick in writing that Roberta would no longer guarantee the obligations of Bear River.
However, there was no agreement or understanding as to when the notice should be sent, and
Roberta did not specify a specific date or timeline as to when written notice terminating the
guarantees should be sent to Agricredit. R. at 603, Tr., p. 13, L. 23-p. 14, L. 4. Roberta
testified that at the time she requested that Bokides notify the creditors, there were no exigent
circumstances that concerned her about being removed immediately from the guarantees.

R. at 603, Tr., p. 45, L. 10- 19. Roberta acknowledged that she expected the letters terminating
the guarantees would be sent by the time the divorce was completed. R. at 603., Tr., p. 44, L. 19
-p. 45, L. 1.
The guaranty agreements executed by Roberta provide that she unconditionally
guaranteed all credit amounts extended to Bear River until she terminated the guarantees. R.
at 37, 180, 247-48. In October of 2006, Bear River financed one tractor, serial
number JJE2026767. Pursuant to the terms of the financing document, Bear River incurred the
liability for the tractor, and a duty to satisfy the obligation, when the tractor was financed. Of the
total amount of the McCormick judgment, $43,331.89 was for the tractor financed prior to the
entry of the divorce decree.
As no time frame was established between Bokides and Roberta to notify the
creditors, the district court relied on Weinstein v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co.,
149 Idaho 299, 233 P.3d 1221 (2010), which holds that where no time of performance is
expressed, the law implies a reasonable time "as determined by the subject matter of the contract,
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the situation of the parties, and the circumstances attending the performance." 149 Idaho 299,
318,233 P.3d 1221, 1240 (2010). In determining what constituted a reasonable time, the Court
considered Roberta's testimony that there were no exigent circumstances that would have
required notice to have been made immediately and her testimony that the notices were to be sent
during the course of the divorce, or by the time the divorce was completed. R. at 603, 606.
Based on these factors and others, the district court concluded that the "reasonable time" for
Bokides to have notified the creditors "would have been by the conclusion of the divorce." R. at
607. The district court further held that "the portion of the McCormick judgment relating to the
tractor financed prior to November 16, 2007, was not proximately caused by Bokides' breach."
R. at 607.
Roberta argues the court's decision is erroneous and that a reasonable time
"should have been no more than sixty (60) days" after she requested Bokides to notify the
creditors. However, Roberta has presented no evidence or legal argument to support this
arbitrarily imposed time period. While an attorney has a duty to follow his client's instructions
with reasonable promptness and care, Roberta presented no expert evidence, as required by
Idaho law, to establish what would constitute the reasonable promptness and care required of
Bokides after he agreed to notify the creditors. See Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz,
134 Idaho 84, 89, 996 P.2d 303 (2000).
Further, Roberta does not dispute that there was no agreed upon time for Bokides
to notify her creditors. R. at 603. Her understanding was only that the creditors would be
notified as part of the divorce. She argues that "it was completely arbitrary to select the divorce
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decree as the implied time of performance." While it is easy in retrospect to say that Bokides
should have notified the creditors earlier, the facts and circumstances at the time of the
agreement dictated that such was not required and that providing notice as part of the dissolution
of the marital relationship was reasonable.
The district court correctly concluded that the damages sustained by Roberta
related to the tractor financed prior to the entry of the divorce decree were not proximately
caused by Bokides' negligence. For the foregoing reasons, Bokides respectfully requests that the
district court's decision to exclude the financing cost associated with the one tractor be affinned.
B.

Request for Attorney Fees and Costs On Appeal.

Attorney fees are available on appeal under Idaho Code Section 12-121 and
Rule 41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules only if the appeal was brought or defended frivolously,
umeasonably, or without foundation. Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 559, 130 P.3d 1087, 1097
(2006). Roberta Shore is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal, as Bokides' appeal and defense
of the cross claim were not frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.
As previously set forth in Appellant's Brief, Bokides, as the prevailing party, is
entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs to defend against Roberta's cross-claim pursuant
to Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41.
III.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing points and authorities, Bokides respectfully requests that
the judgment in Roberta Shore's favor should be reversed in all respects and the matter
remanded to the district court for further proceedings on the issues of whether Roberta mitigated
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her damages, whether it would have been futile to pursue Bill, and whether Roberta has been
damaged.
Bokides also respectfully requests that the Court affirm the district court's
decision excluding the tractor financed prior to the entry of the divorce decree from the
judgment, as the district court's conclusions as to what constituted a reasonable time to notify the
creditors is supported by substantial evidence.
DATED this 30th day of August, 2011.
MOFFATT, THOMAS,BARRETT,ROCK&
FIELDS, CHARTERED

By,44/J~

Bradley J Williams - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Third-Party Defendant/
Appellant/Cross Respondent Nicholas
Bokides
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 30th day of August, 20] 1, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT/CROSS RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF to be
served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile

Jrunes G. Reid
S. Bryce Farris
RlNGERT LAW CHARTERED

455 S. Third
P .0. Box 2773
Boise, ID 83701-2773
Facsimile (208) 342-4657

Bradley J Williams

9

Client 2158592.1

